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POLITICS AND THE COLUMBIA BASIN
ASSESSMENT-LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND




Insanity has been defined as doing the same thing over and over and
expecting a different result. The entire ongoing assessment effort and the
ensuing Draft Environmental Impact Statement involving the Interior
Columbia Basin represent a determined effort to expeditiously obey the
law This involves learning from the past and appropriately modifying be-
havior in moving to the future. The aim is to achieve the objective without
repeating the politically induced foibles typical of the decades-long strug-
gle over federal land management in the "west-side" forests (those lands
lying west of the Cascade Range) in Oregon, Washington, and Northern
California.
LEARNING FROM THE PAST
Revisiting the "forest management train wreck" that occurred, and
continues with the consequences of the infamous "salvage rider" on the
west-side, is essential to understand current land management planning in
the Interior Columbia Basin.' It was obvious (at least to some), some 15
years ago, that the inexorable cutting and concurrent fragmentation of old-
growth forests on the west-side would lead to a collision with the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA).2 The star of the drama was the northern spotted
owl-a sub-species that finds its best habitat in forests characteristic of
* Jack Ward Thomas is the Boone and Crockett Professor of Wildlife Conservation at the
University of Montana School of Forestry. From December 1993 to December 1996 he was the Chief
of the United States Forest Service. This article is adapted from an address delivered as the annual
Frank Church Memorial Lecture on October 10, 1997 at the 17' Annual International Exchange Con-
ference, Lewis-Clark State College, Lewiston, Idaho.
** J.D., 1998, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana; M.S., 1998, Univer-
sity of Montana, Missoula, Montana.
1. The Salvage Rider was passed in 1995 as a rider to the Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terronsm Initiatives, for Assistance in the Re-
covery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act (Emergency Appropria-
tions Act), Pub. L. No. 104-19, §§ 2001-2002, 109 Stat. 194, 240-47 (1995) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§1611 (1996)). This legislation was highly publicized and widely criticized because it included provi-
sions allowing the harvest of a group of sales which had previously been withdrawn for environmental
reasons. See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman, 97 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 - 1544 (1997).
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old-growth forests.
There was a series of efforts, over a decade, by federal land manage-
ment and regulatory agencies to come to grips with the deepening quanda-
ry presented by the changing status of the habitat for the northern spotted
owl. These early efforts failed due to the unwillingness, or inability, to
face up to the social, political, and economic ramifications of even rela-
tively insignificant reductions (as viewed from today's vantage point) in
timber coming from cutting of old-growth forests on Forest Service (FS)
and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands.
THE INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITIEE (ISC)
By 1989, the northern spotted owl was headed for listing by the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) as "threatened" under the requirements of the
ESA. The agency heads of the FS, BLM, FWS, and the National Park
Service (NPS) ordered the formation of an Interagency Scientific Commit-
tee (ISC) to develop a plan to address the old growth/spotted owl issue on
public lands. This team was afforded autonomy to do its assigned work
without the interference that was perceived to have marred previous ef-
forts.
At the team's first meeting, they examined their assignment and
informed the agency heads that they were addressing the wrong question.
They believed that it was a question of the handling of the old-growth
ecosystem and not the status of a single cryptic sub-species of owl. Fur-
ther, they expressed the belief that it was an error to confine the assess-
ment to public lands. They were overruled. In retrospect, the scientists
involved should have "pushed back" harder on the instructions or simply
done the job in a manner that was considered technically appropriate. It is
clear, again in retrospect, that a "partial" look is a biased look and that
there can be political manipulation, intended or not, through restriction of
analysis.
Within six months, the ISC completed an underlying assessment of
ecological conditions and a management plan applying strictly to public
lands. That plan stood up to determined efforts in Congress and within the
Bush Administration to fault the effort on technical grounds. Those as-
saults, particularly from some members of Congress and representatives of
the Administration became pointed and personal. The Chief of the FS,
Dale Robertson, and the Director of the FWS, John Turner, stood fast
behind the team that they had appointed. Others were silent. Later, the
team was accorded significant accolades from several learned societies
attesting to the team's accomplishments in the arena of application of
science to management.
Due to the turbulent political atmosphere, the political handlers of the
FS and the BLM did not allow formal adoption of the ISC strategy In-
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stead, it was announced that land management would take place in a man-
ner "not mconsistent with" the team's recommendations. 3 Simultaneously,
another team assembled by the FWS was considering whether or not to
list the northern spotted owl as threatened under the ESA. Within weeks
of the release of the ISC report, it was recommended that the northern
spotted owl be declared "threatened." The FWS Director concurred.4
BIOLOGICAL NECESSITY VS. POLITICAL
ACCEPTABILITY
The first plans prior to the ISC report dealing with the issues present-
ed by the spotted owl called for reductions in the annual timber sales
levels from the public lands of some four to eight percent. That percentage
was considered too big a social/political/economic pill to swallow Tech-
nicians were ordered back to the drawing board several times. Each subse-
quent effort, due to declining options for management and emerging tech-
nical information, came at a higher price in terms of timber supply. This,
in turn, upped the political resistance to any suggested solution that would
stand up to technical and legal muster. By the time the ISC strategy was
on the table, the impact had come to about a forty per cent reduction in
potential timber sale levels.
Political resistance at both Federal and State levels mounted. There
were exceptions such as Congressman Norm Dicks of Washington who
represented a district with a considerable constituency dependent on the
continued extraction of old-growth from National Forests on the Olympic
Peninsula. Dicks recognized the trend and recommended going along with
the ISC strategy He felt, correctly, that continued "game playing" by
politicians would only exacerbate the situation. Time would attest to his
foresight.
Dicks' colleagues in the Oregon, Washington, and California delega-
tions .did not agree, and the first of what would be a series of "quick fix-
es" was enacted in the form of Section 318 of the 1990 Appropriations
Act.' In order to tide over the dependent timber industry, representatives
3. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,413 (1990).
4. The spotted owl was officially listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act on
June 22, 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990).
5. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Northwest Timber
Compromise Act), 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 745. This bill,
enacted in October of 1989 and dubbed the "Northwest Timber Compromise Act," was one of a series
of nine riders adopted in the 1980's to circumvent legal injunctions, or.limit judicial review of Depart-
ment of Interior and Department of Agriculture activities in the Pacific northwest. In § 318 Congress
directed that federal agencies' compliance with the Section would be "adequate consideration for the
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements" that were the basis of the pending litigation. In Robert-
son v. Seattle Audubon Society the Supreme Court held that this quick fix was a legal exercise of
1998]
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of the timber industry and local "environmentalists" were to work with the
FS and the BLM to designate old-growth timber sales on each National
Forest and District. These sales, most of which were immediately sold and
cut (though some were later withdrawn for environmental reasons), were
to leave a legacy of mischief that still reverberates in western Oregon and
Washington. More on that later.
A SMALL CRYPTIC OWL BECOMES AN ISSUE IN THE BUSH/CLINTON
CAMPAIGN
Not surprisingly, the spotted owl became an issue in the
Bush/Clinton/Perot political campaign for the Presidency of the United
States. In the midst of that campaign, BLM Director, Cy Jamison, sudden-
ly declared that the BLM would, henceforth, abandon the ISC strategy and
instead follow the "Jamison Plan." He declared "his" plan technically
superior to the ISC strategy and claimed that the plan could be camed out
with much less economic and social impact. It was never actually clear
that the Jamison Plan existed as anything more substantive than a news
release.6 But, Jamison's defection caused a federal judge, who had lost
patience with the entire political charade, to shut down the timber sales on
public lands within the range of the northern spotted owl.7 What was
thought to be good politics turned sour in both political and technical
aspects.
That injunction was to stay in place until the Judge's questions were
answered as to the efficacy of the ISC strategy sans the BLM's participa-
tion.8 And, almost as an aside, Judge William Dwyer wanted to know the
effect of the situation on some 39 other species mentioned in government
documents as potentially dependent on old-growth forests. The Judge
seemed to know that the underlying questions were larger than concerns
about a single threatened sub-species. He understood that the clearly stated
purpose of the ESA was "to preserve the ecosystems upon which threat-
ened or endangered species depend."9
authority by the Congress. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
6. Roberta Ulrich, BLM Chief Seeks Forest Balance, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, July 13, 1992.
7. Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991). The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the validity of Judge William Dwyer's injunction in December of 1991. Seattle Audubon
Society v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
8. Id.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1997).
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THE SCIENTIFIc ASSESSMENT TEAM-THE MovE TO ECOSYSTEM
CONSIDERATIONS
As a result, Jack Ward Thomas was assigned by FS Chief Dale Rob-
ertson to head the Scientific Assessment Team (SAT) to answer the
Judge's questions. The SAT asked for permission to expand the assess-
ment to cover nearly 1,000 species that seemed likely to be associated
with the old-growth ecosystem. Permission was forthcoming from FS
Deputy Chief James Overbay Finally, the SAT was beginning to address
the correct question, easily discemable from the purpose of the ESA which
was---"the preservation of ecosystems on which threatened and endangered
species depend."'" The SAT concluded that it could not answer the
Judge's operative question because it simply could not tell what the
"Jamison Plan" entailed.
Later, Jamison ordered the BLM to go to the "God Squad" to gain an
exemption from the ESA for a limited number (44) of timber sales."
This political gamble gave timber industry intervenors the opportunity to
put the ISC strategy, and the scientists involved, on public trial. Mark
Rutzick, the timber industry's lead attorney, declared that it was his inten-
tion to "defrock the high priests of the cult of biology"
The persons that composed the God Squad were all political appoint-
ees of the administration and President Bush had already expressed him-
self strongly on the issue. 2 The God Squad,. in the end, ruled that a por-
tion of the select timber sales could proceed.'3 But, thereafter, they said
that there would have to be compliance with the ISC strategy So, what
appeared to be a victory was, in reality, a decision that kicked the props
out from under the Jamison Plan-whatever it was. This was a classic
phyrmc victory if there ever was one. Evidently, that was too much for the
BLM Director to swallow and the timber sales in question and the
Jamison Plan disappeared from the newspapers. Judge Dwyer's injunction
remained in force.
10. Id.
11. In September of 1991 the Secretary of Interior agreed to convene the God Squad. The "God
Squad" is a committee authorized under § 7(e) of the Endangered Species Act to create exemptions
from the requirements of the ACL 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1997).
12. The members of the God Squad were the Secretary of Agriculture, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, the Secretary of the Army, The Secretary of the Intenor, the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration and individuals from each affected state who were appointed by President
Bush. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1997).
13. On May 15, 1992 the God Squad granted exemptions for 13 or the 44 timber sales that the
BLM had brought before it.
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A FEDERAL JUDGE LOSES PATIENCE
What this political side-show did accomplish was to bring federal
Judge William Dwyer to the end of his patience with delay and maneuvers
to avoid compliance with the law " Judge Dwyer acceded to the requests
of the attorneys representing the environmentalists and simply shut down
all timber sales on Federal lands that involved habitat for the northern
spotted owl-real or potential. 5 That shutdown was to remain in force
until the Government convinced him that there was compliance with the
ESA and compliance with the "diversity clause" of the federal regulations
issued pursuant to the National Forest Management Act. 6 Dwyer was
scathing in his criticism of the persistent efforts of the government to
avoid compliance with the ESA and the NFMA."7
CONGRESS ENTERS THE FRAY-THE GANG OF FOUR
Looking askance at this spiraling fiasco, the Agriculture Committee
of the House of Representatives, decided to try their hand by naming a
committee of four scientists to provide an array of alternatives that might
form the basis for a legislative solution. With some prescience, the Com-
mittee instructed the scientist to consider the "old-growth ecosystem" in
their recommendations. These scientists were Drs. John Gordon of Yale,
Norm Johnson of Oregon State University, Jerry Franklin of the Universi-
ty of Washington, and Jack Ward Thomas of the FS. This team was
quickly and disparaging tabbed the "Gang of Four" by a timber industry
spokesman in a sound bite for the press. The team, and the press, liked the
ring of the name and it stuck. 8
FISH GET IN THE GAME
As The Gang was departing the conference room in the House Office
Building after receiving instructions from the Committee, Congressman
Voelkmer of Missouri called out--"And, don't let us get surprised by
some damn fish." Clearly, listing of various species and runs of
anadromous fish was imminent. The Gang knew it, and Voelkmer's com-
ment was taken as a green light to consider that issue. In response, Drs.
14. Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F Supp. 1081, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd, 952
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. Id.
16. The implementing regulations for the National Forest Management Act require the FS to
provide habitat to "maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate
species " 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1997).
17. Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F Supp. 1081, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
18. Kathie Durban, Experts Secretly Map Areas For Old-Growth Protection, PORTLAND ORE-
GONIAN, June 19, 1991, at A14.
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James Sedell and Gordon Reeves of the FS were added to the team. The
Gang (plus two) quickly delivered an array of alternatives to the Agricul-
ture Committee who promptly held hearings on the report. The intermedi-
ate management option came in with a reduction in anticipated timber cuts
of some 50 per cent. By now, the Presidential election was pending and it
was, presumably, considered the better part of valor to defer action until
after that election. The injunction issued by Judge Dwyer remained in
effect.'9
THE ESA AND THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
During the 1992 campaign for the Presidency, President George Bush
took to the stump m the Pacific Northwest and expressed outrage at the
consequences of the application of the ESA, and with the interpretations
of that law by federal judges in the Ninth Judicial Circuit. He promised
change after the election. Candidate Governor Bill Clinton recognized the
economic and social pain caused by the impasse and promised to bring
matters to some conclusion, in compliance with extant law, in short order,
if he were elected.'
THE FOREST SUMMIT-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOREST ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM (FEMAT)
Obviously, Mr. Clinton won the election and set out to keep his
promise. The new President quickly convened a "Forest Summit" in Port-
land, Oregon, to discuss the problem and possible solutions.2 Shortly
after the Summit, he announced that the Forest Ecosystem Management
Assessment Team (FEMAT) was being formed to provide an array of
alternatives for solution to the impasse. He expected this task to be com-
pleted in 60 days.
This effort would eventually involve nearly 600 people. The team's
instructions were to use "an ecosystem approach" with particular emphasis
on compliance with the ESA (including aquatic species). The effort was to
be conducted under strict security, and the underlying assessment and
management recommendations were to be confined to federal lands. Clear-
ly, a new policy had been set. Evolving circumstances produced a situa-
tion wherein it was clear that the overriding objective (or overriding con-
straint) on the management of public lands was to be the preservation of
19. Evans, 771 F Supp. at 1089.
20. Eric Pryne, Clinton Seeks Middle Ground, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at Dl.
21. The Forest Conference was convened in Portland Oregon on April 2, 1993. Timothy Egan,
Clinton in the Middle During One-day Forest Summit, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1993.
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biodiversity Furthermore, the brunt of compliance with the ESA22 and
the regulations issued pursuant to the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA)" was to be absorbed on the public's lands where feasible.
The "diversity clause" of the NFMA is actually more specific and
more demanding than that of the ESA.24 That clause requires that "
viable populations of all native and desirable non-native species be main-
tained well-distributed within the planning area."2 The team realized that
confining the assessment portion of the effort to public lands was ecologi-
cally inappropriate. The instructions remained intact and the effort was so
executed. Again, in retrospect, the scientists should have "pushed back" on
these instructions. These restrictions made sense in the political arena but
inappropriately restricted the "scientific approach."
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EARLIER EFFORTS
This effort capitalized on lessons learned from earlier efforts. Among
these lessons was that an ecosystem management approach was more
appropriate than a species-by-species approach. The assessment should
include an evaluation of social and economic effects along with ecological
considerations. It was recognized that it was inappropriate to consider only
one option, and that scientists should not make decisions. Instead, scien-
tists should provide decision makers with potential management alterna-
tives and appropriate information on which to base a decision. All the
agencies involved with the application of the myriad pertinent laws (FS,
FWS, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), NPS, and BLM) should be involved from the begin-
ning. It is essential to include an adequate array of technical special-
ists-including economists and social scientists. It was recognized that
ecosystem management is as much about people as anything else.
The FEMAT finished its assignment in 90 days by presenting an
overall underlying assessment of ecological, economic, and social factors
and 10 options with their associated attributes and risks. These options
were incorporated into an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) by a
separate team.26 The President chose "Option 9" which had been consid-
erably modified from the original Option 9 Numerous "bells and whis-
tles" were added, primarily to meet concerns of the FWS, NMFS, and FS
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 - 1544 (1997).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 - 1614 (1997).
24. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1997).
25. Id.
26. DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF HABI-
TAT FOR LATE-SUCCESSIONAL AND OLD-GRowTH FOREST RELATED SPECIES WITHIN THE RANGE OF
THE NORTHERN SPOT-rED OWL (July 1993).
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biologists and environmentalists, and to "assure" compliance by the land
management agencies.27 Some scientists involved with the development
of the original Option 9, were concerned that with the "bells and whistles"
appended to the final version, the timber projections could not be achieved
due to technical, personnel, budget, and time constraints. Experience over
the past four years has shown that concern to be valid.
There was a lesson to be learned: plans should not be larded with
promises that are included to increase the palatability of the plan that may
not be possible to execute. This is a poor way to address lack of trust
between agencies and technical experts, as "bells and whistles," dramati-
cally increase the costs of management. Experience indicates that there is
little likelihood that either the Office of Management and Budget (the
administration in power) or the budget committees in Congress will pro-
vide the necessary resources to fulfill obligations set out in such plans. In
retrospect, the revised Option 9 should have been reviewed by the original
science team to assure conformity with the science, use of all pertinent
information, the statement of confidence intervals, and projections of re-
sults. It is critical that "science" not be used as a shield for political deci-
sions.
The role of science is not to enter the realm of trade-offs that are, of
necessity, based on value judgments.
FINALLY-THE NINTH CiRcuIT SAYS THE TEST IS PASSED (JUST
BARELY)
Of course, groups on both extremes of the issue immediately took the
decision to federal court.28 Option 9 and the process used in its develop-
ment were upheld against all challenges by Judge William Dwyer. The
judge's response to the challenge regarding the legality of "ecosystem
management" is of particular interest. The judge said that, not only was
ecosystem management legal, it was necessary if land management agen-
cies had any hope of simultaneously complying with the myriad laws
directing their management actions."'
MORE LESSONS LEARNED
Improvements could have been made in the process. All deliberations
of the FEMAT were conducted under a "closed process" that precluded
involvement by elected officials, those charged with management responsi-
27. These "bells and whistles" included provisions requiring the maintenance of buffer zones
and other management practices designed to protect habitat and species.
28. Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, 871 F Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
29. Id. at 1311.
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bilities and other interested parties. The team included non-federal em-
ployees, such as university professors with specialized expertise, who were
"employees" in that they were compensated for their services by the feder-
al government.
Therefore, the Office of General Counsel advised that there was prob-
able compliance with the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.3" The Court ultimately decided otherwise-but without consequence
to the outcome of the case. And, by the end of the process, the core team
believed that an underlying assessment should have included all the lands
within the region, regardless of ownership. This would have given a better
view of the overall situation to help guide management decisions for the
public lands.
THE PRESIDENT DIRECTS ATTENTION TO THE
INTERIOR COLUMBIA BASIN
When President Clinton formally announced the adoption of Option
9, he directed that the land management questions facing Oregon and
Washington east of the Cascades be addressed through some similar pro-
cess. Jack Ward Thomas as the new FS Chief and Dr. Mike Dombeck as
Acting Director of the BLM were able to influence the process to be em-
ployed based upon experience and lessons learned in dealing with the
Pacific northwest old-growth controversy
A REVIEW OF MISTAKES MADE AND LESSONS LEARNED
This opportunity caused a review of the lessons learned over the
previous 15 years in dealing with such matters. Among those lessons
learned were:
1) It is unwise to delay dealing with the issue of the preservation of
biodiversity-no matter how much "politics" comes to bear. Delays exac-
erbate the ecological situation by "eating up" management options through
alteration, removal, or fragmentation of habitat. As options are reduced,
adjustments in the status quo to meet requirements of law and technical
validity become increasingly severe.
2) Agencies must act in a coordinated and collaborative fashion
from the beginning in the assessment and development of alternatives for
management. That cooperation must carry through into management.
"Splits" between agencies produce lack of management cohesion and
provide easy targets for adverse publicity and attack on legal grounds.
3) Any action based on less than a full undergirding assessment of
pertinent legal, ecological, social, and economic factors will be subject to
30. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1994).
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continuous-and likely successful-legal and political assault.
4) "New knowledge" such as that which has emerged from the
Columbia Basin Assessment or from ongoing research and monitoring
cannot be ignored without legal consequences.
5) It is unwise to assume that what agency administrators and their
technical and legal advisors consider full compliance with applicable law
will not draw legal challenge from some quarter. It is likewise unwise to
assume that judges will see things your way-or be logical or consistent
in their judgements. That is why we have appeals courts.
6) It is unwise to "pull the tail" of a federal judge. Judges lack a
certain sense of humor when it comes to compliance with the law and the
respect they believe due to the separation of powers doctrine. Federal
judges can and will issue injunctions and court orders that will shut down
resource extraction from federal lands until full compliance with the law
has been achieved.
7) Those judges, and the advocates that will bring cases before
them, are totally familiar with the history of natural resource management
disputes. Judges can deal severely with those who insult their intelligence
by repeating past mistakes (as already determined by other judges).
8) Politicians who promise their constituents that they can get
around the consequences of statutes, case law, and the precedents set in
Pacific northwest old-growth debate, by manipulations of budget or budget
language are likely to do those constituents significant harm in the long
run. Such manipulations through the means of the "quick fix" will only
delay compliance. Experience shows that delays will increase the impact
on those who rely on resource extraction. This will force reliance on Re-
covery Plans, for threatened species as the drivers for land-use planning.
Experience, again, demonstrates the consequences of that approach.
9) The process should be as "open" or "transparent" as possible.
There is, after all, nothing but technical work in progress. Of course, in
observing such a give-and-take process, it is well to remember the old
adage that "this is a lot like sausage, you will enjoy it a lot more if you
don't watch it being made." Such a process will take longer and cost more
but the alleviation of associated paranoia is adequate justification. This
open approach should be considered a significant contribution to demo-
cratic processes.
10) State and local officials should be kept fully informed and fully
involved. At best, this will enhance opportunities to achieve consensus. At
worst, there is the opportunity to fully understand what is going on and to
remove the mystery from the process.
11) The actual "hired hands" doing the day-to-day work should all
be federal employees to avoid any potential conflicts with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. Routine consultation with other State or local
19981
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governmental entities is acceptable and should be encouraged.
12) Peer review of "scientific" assessments should be carried out and
all files concerning such reviews made available.
13) "Science" assessments and reviews should be conducted sepa-
rately from other parts of the process such as EISs, decision documents,
and records of decisions.
DEALING WITH NEW KNOWLEDGE-WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO DO
THAT?
Some advisors to industry realize that "the cat is out of the bag" in
the form of the Columbia Basin assessment and that new knowledge must
be addressed in new or altered land management plans. The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),3 NFMA32 and other federal laws re-
quire the consideration of significant new information in the revision of
land use plans and environmental impact statements. This new information
cannot, therefore be ignored. However, some advisors to industry believe
that there will be a better result for their constituents if the ongoing broad-
scale Draft EIS is terminated through instructions in the budget authoriza-
tion language or as a rider to the budget bill. That language would, pre-
sumably, include instructions to terminate the ongoing process and, in-
stead, start with individual forest and district planning efforts. That would
have one or more negative consequences.
No matter which way the planning process proceeds, top down or
bottom up, it will be essential in the final analyses that plans "add up" to
some coherent whole. The "bottom up" approach will, inevitably, be a
more expensive and more time-consuming way to achieve a coherent
whole. That approach also produces enormous technical difficulties in
dealing with questions of cumulative effects-inevitably producing under-
estimates of those effects. We have been there and done that-do we
never learn?
Whether federal judges, considering an almost certain legal challenge
to a bottom up approach, will tolerate the associated delay is a question to
ponder. There is already probably serious judicial aggravation over slow-
ness and/or inappropriateness of actions of federal agencies in the listing
process for bull trout, various runs of steelhead trout and salmon, wolver-
ines, lynx, fisher, and other species, and it seems likely that judges will
exhibit little patience. In addition, numerous other species will come to the
forefront of attention for the FWS and the NMFS for consideration for
declaration as "threatened" and "endangered." Of course, grizzlies, wolves,
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1997).
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1997).
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spotted owls, marbled murrelets and other high profile species will contin-
ue as part of the picture.
The "bottom up" approach is bad strategy for those dependent on
resource extraction and good strategy for those who desire, ultimately, the
institution of the maximum possible preservationist approach. Experience
has shown that delay only makes the situation worse in the long run for
those interested in resource extraction. This results from rapid diminution
in "decision space" and possible management options.
CONSIDERING THE TRACK RECORD OF ADVISORS
It is well to consider the track record of those who advise "quick fix"
solutions. Nearly all of the twists, turns, and legal actions instituted upon
such advice m the course of the forest management disputes on the west-
side of Oregon and Washington backfired. Those evasive actions turned
out to have severe negative long-term impacts on resource extraction and
those that relied on extraction activities for their dally bread and the feed-
ing of their county government and schools. Telling folks for political
purposes what they desperately want to hear often produces severe conse-
quences.
A MORE APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION
Without dramatic immediate alteration in the ESA and the regulations
issued pursuant to the NFMA that deal with retention of
biodiversity-which seems highly unlikely within the next several
years-the most rational course of action for those interested in resource
extraction from the public's lands is to expeditiously comply with the
extant laws. Fortunately, m the case of the Interior Columbia Basin, this
course of action can be facilitated by the best underlying assessment of
ecological, social, economic, and legal factors that has ever been com-
piled. It should be considered an opportunity to be seized and not as a
threat to be resisted.
GAMES THAT PEOPLE PLAY-OR WHEN ELEPHANTS FIGHT
There is a sophisticated social / political / legal game in play The
players are the "elephants" that fight on behalf of their sponsors that rep-
resent the polar extremes in the debate. They are experienced and skilled
fighters seasoned by previous conflicts. They fight hard and they fight to
win-through whatever means are available. But it is well for those who
do not strongly identify with either of these "war elephants" to heed an
old Indian proverb. That proverb's wisdom is that, "When elephants fight
it is the grass that suffers most." It is important to ask just who are the
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"elephants" and who represents "the grass."
CAN MORE AND BETTER "SCIENCE" DELIVER
STABILITY9
This is not an issue about science. While science has a role to play in
developing and describing the consequences of management options and
estimating risks, it cannot deliver stability Listen carefully to those that
pick at the science involved in a decision. They are not so much upset
with the science as they are with the changes that are in the wind.
To want "stability," to want things to stay the same, is a common
human longing. For years the story of the regulated forest that would
provide forest products was told and retold in such a sustained and pre-
dictable fashion that "community stability" became a beacon for federal
land managers-and for foresters in general.
This vision was a dream that faded slowly-and, then, collapsed, in
the glare of reality We now recognize that we are one drought, one insect
or disease outbreak, one dramatic fire season, one law, one court case, one
election, one budget, one press campaign, one propaganda blitz, one shift
in demographics, one change in public opinion, one shift in market de-
mand, one shift in price, one loss of a management tool (say DDT or
clearcutting), or one piece of "new information," away from stability at all
times. These influences do not emerge one at a time. They ripen in bunch-
es much like bananas.
The only communities that exhibit stability over the long term are
those significantly diversified in terms of ability and willingness to
change. Yet, there are isolated rural communities that have been, and are,
almost totally dependent on resource extraction from public lands for
sustenance. And, there lies the rub. Many of these communities have little
desire for, or willingness to accept, change.
CHANGE-SCARY BUT INEVITABLE
For those caught in change not of their desire nor of their making--
particularly change that strikes at the foundation of one's "life style" and
livelihood--there is real fear and a resultant visceral reaction. It is, then, a
natural reaction to go to elected officials and ask that they stay the forces
of change--if only for a little while. It is only natural for those elected
officials to be sympathetic to those concerns. But, unless they are students
of what has gone before in such situations, the politicians are apt to repeat




THESE ARE HUMAN NOT TECHNICAL ISSUES
In fact, the guts of this controversy are not primarily technical in
nature. These are human issues rooted in differences in morality, ethics,
belief, political position, and, most of all, dependent on whose ox is get-
ting gored. These human factors sometimes become embodied in law But,
when these expressions of national will embodied in law are applied in
regional and local arenas where there is deep concern with the conse-
quences of the compliance to those laws there is, commonly, reluctance,
and even resistance. Initially, there is room and reason to argue exactly
what the law requires and what constitutes compliance. But, as the case
law piles up higher and higher, there is less and less room for arguing
these matters.
There is little that agency administrators can do to alter that situation
except to learn from the past and modify approaches to ensure compliance
with the law in a manner that produces the least social disruption and the
most overall efficiency Such conflicts cannot be solved through sci-
ence-ecological, social or economic. Clearly, the costs of compliance
with the laws have escalated to the point that is becoming more and more
unlikely that "harvesting" of natural resources from public lands can be
achieved in an "above cost" fashion. While there are always some effi-
ciencies that can be captured, this is an insidious problem of the extant
"crazy quilt" of law and regulations that requires attention from Congress
if there is to be resolution.
The question that Congress will soon be called upon to answer is
whether or not "multiple use" that includes extraction of resources is to
continue as a significant aspect of the mission of the Forest Service. If so,
a reform of pertinent laws to enhance the compatibility of those laws
seems mandatory
CONGRESS MAKES AND UNMAKES THE LAW-BLESSED BE THE NAME OF
THE CONGRESS
The legislative process executed by the Congress sets out the playing
field and defines the rules of the natural resource management game. That
is done through the formulation, passage and modification of the law
Designated officials then carry out those laws. Then, only regulators, or if
the regulators fail in their duties, judges can call fouls and impose penal-
ties on the players. If the results of the application of law and pursuant
regulatory action and related court decisions are judged intolerable, the
law can and should be changed. That is the purview and solemn duty of
members of Congress.
In the meantime, attempts to evade the law-no matter how political-
ly expedient in the short term-are bad medicine and, based on past expe-
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rience, can be expected to produce an unanticipated and unwelcome result
in the longer term. For those most concerned with resource extraction,
constraints are apt to be more severe, and for those interested in environ-
mental protection, considerable additional alterations in the environment
will have occurred. For both groups, there is a significant loss of manage-
ment options.
THE TEMPTATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SHORT CUTS AND QUICK
FIXES
If one were to compose a set of laws of natural resource manage-
ment, a key law would be that "Quick Fixes to Real Or Perceived
Problems Resulting From Compliance with Natural Resources Laws Lead
Inevitably to Insanity"
There are, of course, a number of corollaries to this "law" They are
as follows:
Corollary 1. The interactions of numerous laws (formulated in differ-
ent congressional committees and passed by different Congresses) and
regulations (issued by different agencies with different missions) with little
or no consideration of the interactions of those laws and regulations, when
simultaneously executed, produce undesirable effects. These effects result
from overlaps in agency jurisdiction and the inevitably of clarification
(i.e., confusion) from sometimes conflicting and always evolving case law
These problems are confounded by the unacceptability of the management
outcomes which vary by geographic locale and constituency This, inevita-
bly, produces a situation that is unacceptable to some members of Con-
gress.
Corollary 2. These members of Congress, if powerful enough, will
propose a "quick fix" to the perceived problem. Knowing that the pro-
posed quick fix would never receive approval if introduced and debated as
a bill, the member inserts the quick fix as a "rider" to some piece of legis-
lation that must be passed-or where it will not be noticed.
Corollary 3. The quick fix will inevitably cause more problems than
it solves.
Corollary 4. The problems caused by the quick fix will, more often
than not, produce the need for a quick fix of the quick fix.
Corollary 5. The ramifications of the interactions of a series of quick
fixes are multiplicative as opposed to additive.
Corollary 6. At every iteration of the quick fix syndrome, it is possi-
ble to search for, address, and bring forth a solution to underlying prob-
lem.
Corollary 7 Addressing underlying problems, such as conflicting and
overlapping laws, requires understanding, the power to influence and per-
suade, and hard work over a prolonged period with small chance of suc-
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cess. These, of course, are most excellent reasons to avoid this approach.
Corollary 8. Therefore, another try at a quick fix will evolve as "the
answer."
Corollary 9. Doing the same thing over and over and expecting a
different result is insanity.
First, remember just what a "rider" is. This is an expeditious means
of getting something into law that would be highly unlikely to occur under
a normal legislative process. Examine the sad story of the now infamous
"salvage rider."
This rider to an emergency appropriation gave instructions to the
Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management to accelerate the
salvage of fire and bug-killed or damaged timber, to reduce fire hazard.33
As part of that process, such sales were exempted from appeals. And, as
an afterthought, it was directed that the "318 Sales" (remember that quick
fix from a rider to the 1990 Appropriations Bill) and all other sales within
the area that had been withdrawn for environmental reasons were to be
released to the original buyers under original conditions. The results were
a public relations disaster for the timber industry, the Clinton Administra-
tion, and the land management agencies that carried out the requirements
of the law
As Dr. Jerry Franklin (an acclaimed forest ecologist at the University
of Washington) noted verbally, the results of the salvage sales were of
minor ecological significance. The results in terms of salvage timber of-
fered for sale by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
were probably little different than would have resulted from the aggressive
salvage programs already underway
Inclusion of the "318" sales and other sales that had been withdrawn
for environmental reasons were used by opponents to paint the salvage
efforts as an excuse to cut green timber. These sales had nothing to do
with salvage. These were "green sales" ordered by law as part of the sal-
vage rider. In fact, this was a nder to the rider. The effect was devastating
as the TV footage of old growth logs from the "318" and other previously
withdrawn sales on trucks headed to the mills graced the evening news
night after night.
Such are the results of a quick fix modified by a second quick fix
with a third quick fix tacked on just for good measure. There may yet be
other consequences as hard core environmentalists question whether the
President's Plan for the west-side has now been undermined to the extent
that re-evaluation is in order.
33. Pub. L. No. 104-19, §§ 2001-2002, 109 Stat. 194, 240-47 (1995) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §1611 (1996)).
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CONCLUSION
If you do not like the current law or its consequences, change the
law In the meantime what should be done? Recognize that change is
inevitable. Do not fight change. Instead, work to guide change. Obey the
law Do not delay Do not try to play head games with a federal judge.
Avoid the temptation of the quick fix. Look at the situation in the Colum-
bia Basin as an opportunity to speed compliance and resolution. Get in-
volved so as to be part of the solution-which will come sooner or later.
Sooner will be better all around.
